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Ethics, Law,
and the
Science of Fish Welfare

ABSTRACT
Fish farming is one of the fastest growing sectors of agriculture, attracting considerable attention to the question of whether existing
farming regulations and animal welfare laws are adequate to deal
with the expanding role of fish in feeding humans. The role of fish as
model organisms in scientific research is also expanding—a majority
of research biology departments now keep zebrafish for the purposes
of genome biology, and they are used widely used for basic neuroscience research. However, due to their diversity and distance from
mammalian biology, fish pose difficult questions for the application
of legal and ethical principles of animal welfare. This paper reviews
the developing legal and scientific context in which such questions
must be answered.
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Many people think of fish as below the “interesting” threshold of cognitive complexity or sentience, and thus beyond ethical concern. The story is, however, a lot more complicated than
it is usually made to appear. Fish present hard cases, because
they are anatomically and neuroanatomically very different
from us, and the functional properties of their nervous systems
are hard to investigate (Vargas et al. 2009). Nevertheless, as I
will describe, there is evidence of complex behavior in various species—much more complex than the usual stereotype for
fish—and this should make us wonder whether the right criteria
have been applied to judgments of their lack of cognitive sophistication, and what the proper scientific methods for studying these questions should be.
My approach to questions of fish cognition and consciousness stem mainly from my theoretical interests in philosophy
of science and mind, where fish are particularly interesting
because they present boundary cases. I do not approach these
questions as an ethicist or a jurist, nor with a particular ethical agenda aimed at increasing protection for fish or expanding
our exploitation of the for food, research, and recreation. However, it seems to me that one significant aspect of moral and
legal progress consists in the expansion of the circle of moral
and legal concern from the in-group, those who are presently
included in the moral or legal community, to members of the
current out-group. So one question to ask is whether fish are
going to be swept up in this expansion. The expansion is happening in different ways and at different rates. Others before
me have made the point that the law follows public opinion in
many ways, and public opinion sometimes follows what the
philosophers are doing. The philosophers are sometimes, in my
view, not paying enough attention (or only selective attention)
to science, and here I echo the title of Quintelier et al. (2011)
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that “Normative ethics does not need a foundation: it needs
more science.” But how might the science of fish be deployed
in legal or ethical contexts?
There is a complex interplay internally and externally to the
relevant sciences. Things move at different rates on different
fronts. Attempts to understand and justify our decisions about
whether or not the laws are adequate, or our ethical principles
are doing the job, all must be understood against this complex
environment. It is easy, for example, to criticize the law for
drawing politically motivated and scientifically unjustified
lines. The Animal Welfare Act in the United States was under
litigation a few years ago when anti-vivisectionists sued the
US Department of Agriculture claiming that the USDA did not
consistently apply the regulations to all the different species
of animals in laboratories. The response by Congress was to
change the definition of “animal” as follows:
any live or dead dog, cat, monkey, non human or primate mammal, or other such warm-blooded animal as
the secretary may determine is being used, or is intended for use, for research, testing, experimentation,
or exhibition purposes, or as a pet; but such term (sic)
excludes (1) birds, rats of the genus Rattus and mice
of the genus Mus, bred for use in research, (2) horses
not used for research purposes, and (3) other farm animals... (7 U.S.C. 54, 2009, sec. 2132)
Although the excluded species are regulated elsewhere, from
a biologist’s point of view, this definition of animal seems arbitrary. Why the exclusion? The excluded animals in clause
(1) above comprise 95% of laboratory animals. This was Congress’s response to the challenge that the law was not being
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properly applied to laboratory animals. We might look at this
as philosophers or biologists, and say “how irrational.” But the
law needs to define “animal” in a way that is suitable for the
political and social aims of the Act, not for common sense or
for the purposes of a scientific taxonomy. We cannot criticize
it on the grounds that “that is not what ‘animal’ means.” One
may disagree with the political or social aims, of the Act, but
we must understand the role of the definitions within it relative
to its aims. Scientific considerations do, however, matter when
it comes to the applicability of the laws and their contained
definitions.
To further this point, let us look at the animal welfare laws
from a few other countries. Several of them refer to warmbloodedness, a point I shall return to later. The United Kingdom’s Animal Scientific Procedures Act of 1986 states,
“a protected animal” for the purposes of this act, as any
living vertebrate other than man, and any invertebrate
of the species Octopus vulgaris (ASPA 1986, Chapter
14; emphasis in original)
Again, from a biologist’s or philosopher’s point of view, the
protection of exactly one species among the invertebrates seems
completely arbitrary, although the 1986 law also permitted the
UK Secretary of State to extend the definition of “protected
animal” to include “invertebrates of any description after the
stage of development where it becomes capable of independent
feeding.” However, the act protected vertebrates in the fetal/
embryonic stage only during the second half of its incubation
or gestation period, but no rationale was given for this cutoff
point. In the more recent UK Animal Welfare Act of 2006, there
was a slight modification of the treatment of invertebrates. The
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2006 Act still allows the definition to be extended to include invertebrates, provided that “the appropriate national authorities
are satisfied on the basis of scientific evidence that these animals are capable of experiencing pain or suffering.” So, for the
first time in the UK law, scientific assessment of the capability
for pain or suffering gets explicitly into the regulations determining what may be ruled into the circle of legal protection.
In Canada’s Health of Animals Act of 1990 the definition of
animal includes fertilized eggs or ovum. The Act illustrates the
trend in industrialized countries towards making the prevention
of animal pain and suffering explicit in the law, making it an
offence by anyone who “wilfully causes, or being the owner,
wilfully permits to be caused unnecessary pain, suffering, or injury to an animal or a bird” (S.C. 1990, c.21, 1/.445.1). The explicit mention of birds here might also cause interpretive questions concerning the meaning of “animal,” putting into question whether fish would be automatically covered. A mixture of
folk and scientific categories of animals is evident in Canada’s
Criminal Code (R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46) where “cattle” is defined
as “neat cattle or an animal of the bovine species why whatever
technical or familiar name it is known, and includes any horse,
mule, ass, pig, sheep, or goat.”
In Australia, animal welfare is handled at the state or territory level. The Queensland Animal Care and Protection Act of
2001 explicitly mentions protection for live marsupial young,
and it explicitly mentions fish. The Act also identifies protected
species of invertebrates by using scientific taxonomic names,
groups Cephalopoda and Malacostraca, although it mentions
examples of each of these categories by their common names
(octopi and squid for the former, and crabs, crayfish, lobsters,
and prawns for the latter). Here the law has moved consider-
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ably away from folk notions of animals, handing the categories
to a scientific taxonomy.
During 2012-2015 the European Union is engaged in a process of revising its statutory framework for animal welfare. Although it is not yet law, the European Commission’s initial report to the European Parliament and related committees (COM
2012) mentions explicitly the need to investigate questions of
fish welfare because of the increasing trend of fish farming. The
Commission states its intention to “continue to seek scientific
advice on a species by species basis” in evaluating fish welfare
issues.
One discernible trend in this brief survey of the international
regulatory scene is the increasing role of science not just in
the formulation of principles but in the codification of the laws
themselves (see also Allen 2004). This appeal to science has at
least two fronts. On the one hand there is concern for scientific
classification. While my earlier point still stands that political and social reasons may allow lines to be drawn anywhere,
nevertheless categories that are vague or based in folk notions
of animal categories may lead to interpretive difficulties that
legal systems should wish to avoid, and that may be avoided
by adopting a scientific taxonomy. On the other hand there
is concern to identify just those species that may actually be
harmed by human actions, particular with respect to their pain
and suffering. This raises questions of how those effects are to
be discerned in protected species. And once again, because folk
criteria have only limited application it is not surprising that,
as the British law makes explicit, scientific advice should be
sought.
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In a previous paper (Allen 2006), I outlined an ethics/science
interface which can be extended for the purposes of this paper
by putting ethics and law on the same side, science on the other.
The interface is presented as an argumentative structure:
1. Argue that moral/legal status depends on possession of some properties M [the “ethics premise”]
2. Assess the scientific evidence that treatment T affects M in species S [the “science premise”]
3. Conclude/legislate/act accordingly for or against
subjecting S to T
In discussions framed in this way, participants argue that moral
or legal status depends on possessing some relevant properties, or M properties. Some examples of properties considered
ethically relevant are the capacity for pain or suffering, the capacity to hold desires, the ability to plan for future life, etc.
Participants to the discussion additionally assess the scientific
evidence that some treatment of an animal affects the relevant
property or properties one way or another. Then on the basis of
what the scientific evidence says, they can conclude, legislate,
or act accordingly against treating members of the species in
the specified way.
In this paper I am not going to be focusing on the ethics
premise. It is to be understood that there may be multiple ethical perspectives here which are relevant to thinking about animal welfare/ethics more generally. Rather, I’m focused on the
science premise and how assessments of the relevant M properties may be justified.
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So what is it like to be a fish? A lot of what people say about
this is based either implicitly or explicitly on comparison to
mammals. Rose (2002, 33) argues from the extensive role of
frontal and parietal neocortical regions in mammalian pain biology that, “the fundamental requirements for pain/suffering
are now known. Fishes lack the most important of these required neural structures, and they have no alternative neural
systems for producing the pain experience. Therefore, the reactions of fishes to noxious stimuli are nociceptive and without
conscious awareness of pain.” Nociception is the term the scientists use for the capacity to detect noxious stimuli that causes
withdrawal from the stimuli, but not necessarily any conscious
experience of it. From experiment on mammals whose spinal
cord has been severed, it is known that one can still activate
lower-limb withdrawal responses to noxious stimuli. With no
connection or signal getting to the brain there is presumably no
conscious experience associated with the peripheral nociceptive circuits, but the avoidance response is still there. So the
mere evidence that the animal withdraws a part of its body from
something noxious is not sufficient to establish the conscious
experience of pain.
Victoria Braithwaite (2010) presents a contrasting view,
where she writes that there is as much evidence for fish suffering as there is for birds or mammals. So what is the evidence?
The numerous experiments on fish responses to noxious stimuli
include injecting bee venom into the lips of trout. Fish treated
in this way spent the next couple of hours rubbing their mouths
on the bottom of the tank, eating less, and showing symptoms
of irritation at the point of contact. The locations of nociceptive sites on the rainbow trout’s head have also been identified (Sneddon et al. 2003). Thus Braithwaite and her colleagues
claim that there is a good peripheral sensory argument and be-
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havioral evidence for the claim that fish feel pain. Still this is
far from consensus, for at roughly the same time Cabanac and
colleagues (Cabanac et al. 2009) argued that consciousness did
not generally emerge in phylogeny until the amniotes some 350
million years ago. The addition of an amniotic barrier in the
egg frees them from laying eggs in water and allows these species to reproduce on dry land. Cabanac et al. produce a number
of lines of arguments for their claim based on whether or not
there are signs of emotion, sensory pleasure, play, and sleep in
various vertebrate groups.
I will confine myself here to a few comments about their
claims concerning sleep and emotion (see Allen 2011 for additional detail). Cabanac et al. claim that there is no evidence
for sleep in fish. But Yokogawa et al. (2009) have characterized
sleep in zebrafish, and looked at the effects of insomnia in mutant forms of these fish. They found that not only do zebrafish
go through periods similar to mammalian sleep, but they suffer
from a rebound effect, so if you deprive them of sleep, then
over time, they will need to make up that deficit. From this
they conclude that sleep seems to be a real biological need for
fish, which has real biological consequences. Cabanac (pers.
comm.) responds that there is no evidence in fish for a REM
(rapid eye movement) phase of sleep, which is known to be
cognitively important in mammals. It must be conceded that
the precise role of the sleep state in zebrafish and whether it
serves the same function as REM sleep in mammals, remains
to be investigated. Furthermore, zebrafish are not goldfish, so
we must remain alert to species differences. I conclude that too
little is known about sleep in fish to make it the basis for any
broad claims about fish consciousness.
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To make their case against emotion in fish, Cabanac and colleagues experimented on goldfish, and investigated different
ways of possibly inducing a change in body temperature in these
fish and observing their response (Cabanac and Laberge 1998).
Fish administered pyrogens, fever-inducing infectious agents,
were compared to fish that were handled by the experimenters.
They gave the fish a choice either to swim in a tank at 37˚ C or
in one at 34˚ C. The idea is that if their body temperatures are
raised, they should prefer the cooler tank. The pyrogen-treated
fish preferred the cooler tank. The handled fish showed no preference. Cabanac concludes that unlike mammals and birds, the
stress of handling does not induce “emotional fever,” i.e. raised
body temperature in response to acutely stressful experiences,
and this indicates to him that they do not experience emotions
at all.
A worry about this conclusion is that one might not expect an
ectothermic (cold-blooded) organism to have the same thermoregulatory responses as an endothermic (warm-blooded) organism, particularly if body heating in response to acute stress in
terrestrial animals is part of a flight response in red muscle tissue whereas white fish muscle is less dependent on blood supply for fast response. One might also worry that learning from
prior experience of handling by the goldfish used in Cabanac’s
experiment could also play a role in their responses. Goldfish,
however, have a reputation for being particularly unable to retain learned information, a reputation that is encapsulated in the
common trope of a 3-second memory. Nevertheless, according
to both Mythbusters (season 2, episode 11, first aired January
25, 2004) and an Australian schoolboy’s science fair project
(widely reported in news media in February 2008), the 3-second memory is a myth—goldfish can retain learned responses
over much longer time spans. Of course, these tests were not
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subject to scientific peer review. In the scientific literature, Bitterman (1975) compared goldfish to monkeys on a task where
the animals could feed at one of two locations, and he varied
the amount of success at those locations. In the situation where
the food reward schedule was for 70% of the approaches to one
station and 30% of approaches to the other, goldfish appeared
to match, meaning they went to the 70% station roughly 70% of
the time, which gets them a reward 49% of the time, and they
go to the other station 30% of the time, so they get a reward 9%
of the time, for an overall success rate of 58%. The monkeys in
Bitterman’s experiment went to the higher return station almost
all the time, and thus received the food reward almost 70% of
the time. So, monkeys look smarter (being better rational optimizers) in this experiment.
Here then, is where perhaps the bad reputation of the goldfish got consolidated. But we should not be so hasty to generalize to all fish, and perhaps not even to all goldfish. Kotrschal
and Taborsky (2010) studied the development of learning abilities in a ciclid fish, from a genus of African freshwater fish. In
their experiment, the fish were kept during the first year of their
lives in one of four conditions: they either received the same
low food ration every day, the same high level ration, or they
experienced one change in the food ration during that first year,
either from low to high or high to low. The fish were then kept
for a couple of months during which they received enough food
to equalize average body weights across the four groups, before
being given a learning test. Kotrschal and Taborsky and found
that the fish who had experienced the single feeding change,
whether low to high or high to low, performed much better than
the fish with the constant feeding schedule, even though that
change had been experienced months before. If just one small
change in experience can affect learning abilities of goldfish,
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it is salutary to think about how the standard laboratory conditions for the goldfish in Bitterman’s study could have made
considerable difference to the outcome of that experiment.
I have been hinting that we should also pay attention to the
differences among fish species. The category of “fish” is actually not a very well defined taxonomic category from a biological perspective, because not all the descendants of fish are fish
(mammals and birds being descended from the Sarcopterygii,
or lobe-finned fishes). To use the biological jargon, fish do not
comprise a monophyletic clade. It is somewhat sobering to realize that we humans are more closely related to coelacanths
than coelacanths are to tuna or goldfish, and sharks and rays
are also off on different branch from the groups containing any
of the species mentioned so far. Setting aside the classificatory
worries, there are 31,500 known species of fish, comprising of
60% of all vertebrates, and that number continues to grow as
new species are discovered. These species vary enormously.
There are ectothermic, cold-blooded fish and endothermic,
warm-blooded fish. Tuna maintain body temperatures much
higher than ambient, and swordfish can maintain brain and eye
temperatures above the ambient temperature. They have enormously different breeding systems. Some lay eggs, some gestate eggs internally, some have a protoplacental arrangement.
In light of this variation, to generalize about fish is irresponsible. And when we get to neuroanatomical studies, there is just
as much diversity of form and function. To take goldfish or
zebrafish as models for all fish is highly problematic.
The behavior of fish is also highly diverse and in many cases
more complex than typically recognized (see Allen 2011 for
review). For example, Bshary et al. (2006) have documented
repeated instances of cooperative hunting between a grouper
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and a moray eel in the Red Sea. The grouper approaches the
moray’s lair, does a head shake, and the eel follows the grouper
to a hole where a prey fish is hiding. The moray goes into the
hole, flushing the fish out. If the prey gets away, the grouper
chases it until the prey hides under the reef, then comes back to
the moray to lead the eel to the new refuge of the prey. Bshary
et al. observed a 50% distribution of the prey catches between
the grouper and the moray.
But what has complex behavior to do with ethically or legally relevant properties, which I have been referring to as the
“M” properties? A key issue here concerns how to link cognitive and behavioral complexity to conscious experience. In a
previous paper on animal pain (Allen 2004), I argued that an
answer to this challenge might involve a substantive theory of
the function of consciousness, and I suggested that attention to
learning, particularly a fine-grained analysis of different kinds
of learning, could help. There are several accounts of the function of consciousness that reject the epiphenomenalist view
that consciousness is causally and functionally inert. Some of
the non-epiphenomenalist theories attribute more simple functions, other more complex ones. Learning is in the middle of
this range, and here is one illustration of why I think a finegrained analysis of different learning types should be of interest.
In standard Pavlovian “delay” conditioning, a new stimulus is presented (think of Pavlov’s bell) and while it is present
(ringing) the old (unconditioned) stimulus is also presented.
Eventually, the animal starts responding to the new (conditioned) stimulus just as it did to the old (unconditioned) stimulus—e.g. by salivating when the bell rings in Pavlov’s case.
A second form of conditioning, “trace conditioning,” is very
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similar except that the new stimulus (the CS) is removed or
stopped before the unconditioned stimulus (US) is presented.
For instance, the bell stops ringing before the food appears.
Some animals under some conditions will nevertheless learn
to respond appropriately to CS in a delay condition. Clark and
Squire (1998) published a comparative study of humans and
rabbits involved in both trace and delay conditioning. In their
experiment, the US was a puff of air directed towards the eye,
the CS was an audible tone, and the unconditioned response is
an eye-blink. In the delay condition the puff of air comes while
the tone is still audible, and in the trace condition it comes after
the tone has ended. In Clark and Squire’s experiments, every
subject, rabbit or human, acquired the eye-blink response to the
tone in the standard Pavlovian delay conditioning procedure.
But in the trace conditioning procedure only about half the
people and half the rabbits acquired the response. The human
subjects were debriefed, and of those in the delay conditioning
group, only about half showed any knowledge that there was a
relationship between the tone and the puff of air, but in the trace
conditioning group all and only those subjects who acquired
the response were able to report noticing that the puff of air
was preceded by the tone. Here we have a correlation between
the occurrence of conscious awareness of a relationship among
stimuli and one particular kind of learning, but not another. Furthermore, I argued (Allen 2004) that this relationship ties into
some plausible theories about the function of consciousness,
specifically in connection with working memory or a “global
workspace” (Baars 1997). I do not mean to suggest that this
is the only kind of learning worth investigating—elsewhere I
have argued that place preference conditioning is another important tool (Allen et al. 2005). The point is just that a scientific
approach to assessment of conscious pain has more potential
avenues of investigation than is often realized.
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In context of fish welfare and fish agriculture, this turns out
to be very interesting. Cod, halibut, and trout are among some
of the most commonly farmed species, and it seems that the
ecology of these animals makes a huge difference to trace conditioning. Trace conditioning is also important from the agricultural perspective since giving fish a cue that they are about
to be fed can greatly decrease the amount of food that is wasted.
Initially, biologists struggled to show that halibut were capable
of trace conditioning, whereas it was relatively easy to demonstrate in cod and trout (Nilsson et al. 2008; Nordgreen et al.
2010). However, halibut are sit-and-wait ambush predators, so
it does not behoove them to start moving as soon as they get a
cue that food is nearby. They must wait for the prey to approach
within striking distance. Once the importance of a long delay
was recognized, trace conditioning was indeed found (Nilsson
et al. 2010). Trace conditioning is also an important tool for
investigating homology between fish brains and those of other
vertebrates (Vargas et al. 2009).
In this paper I have pointed out some trends in ethics, expanding circles of inclusion, the law, replacement of folk categories and concepts with explicit appeal to science, and in the
sciences of more sophisticated techniques for species-specific
assessments. However, despite the fact that the sciences are
presenting ever richer information about fish, there remains no
clear consensus about their capacities for cognition and consciousness. This lack of consensus is potentially confounding
to ethicists and legislators, and it leaves the ethicists in particular with a dilemma. On the one hand, law and science call for
more reliance on scientific research, but on the other hand, the
very kind of research to figure out what fish may learn from
things such as painful stimuli is potentially objectionable re-
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search that may need to be carried out on almost a species-byspecies basis.
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